Can Business Continuity Management Create Reliability in Airports? (Issues from Theory into Practice) by Bevern, Verena & Barnes, Paul
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Bevern, Verena & Barnes, Paul (2010) Can Business Continuity Manage-
ment Create Reliability in Airports? (Issues from Theory into Practice).
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/67591/
c© Copyright 2010 Queensland University of Technology
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
Airports of the Future 
© 2010 QUT 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Can Business Continuity Management  
Create Reliability in Airports? 
- Issues from Theory into Practice - 
 
Verena Bevern 
& Paul Barnes 
 
BCM/IRM Program 
Airports of the Future, 
Queensland University of Technology, 
Brisbane, Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Airports of the Future 
© 2010 QUT 
2 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 3 
Section 1: Key Concepts & Theories ................................................................................................. 5 
1.1 Threat ...................................................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 Vulnerability ............................................................................................................................ 5 
1.3 Risk & Crisis ............................................................................................................................. 7 
1.4 Business Continuity Management .......................................................................................... 9 
1.5 Normal Accident Theory ....................................................................................................... 11 
1.6 High Reliability Theory .......................................................................................................... 12 
Section 2: Critical Infrastructure ..................................................................................................... 17 
3.1 Airports as CI and Socio-Technical Systems .......................................................................... 18 
Section 3: Potential Links between HRT and BCM ......................................................................... 20 
Section 4: Potential Applications of HRT to Airports ...................................................................... 25 
4.1 Current Research on CI Systems and High Reliability ........................................................... 29 
Discussion........................................................................................................................................ 32 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 38 
Appendix: Guidance from the relevant literature .......................................................................... 40 
References ...................................................................................................................................... 43 
 
 
 
  
Airports of the Future 
© 2010 QUT 
3 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The advances made within the aviation industry over the past 
several decades have significantly improved the availability, 
affordability and convenience of air travel and have been greatly 
beneficial in both social and economic terms. Air transport has 
developed into an irreplaceable service being relied on by millions 
of people each day and as such airports have become critical 
elements of national infrastructure to facilitate the movement of 
people and goods. As components of critical infrastructure (CI), 
airports are integral parts of a national economy supporting 
regional as well as national trade, commercial activity and 
employment. Therefore, any disruption or crisis which impacts the 
continuity of operations at airports can have significant negative 
consequences for the airport as a business, for the local economy 
and other nodes of transport infrastructure as well as for society. 
Due to the highly dynamic and volatile environment in which 
airports operate in, the aviation industry has faced many different 
challenges over the years ranging from terrorist attacks such as 
September 11, to health crises such as the SARS epidemic to 
system breakdowns such as the recent computer system outage at 
Virgin Blue Airlines in Australia. All these events have highlighted 
the vulnerability of airport systems to a range of disturbances as 
well as the gravity and widespread impact of any kind of 
discontinuity in airport functions. Such incidents thus emphasise 
the need for increasing resilience and reliability of airports and 
ensuring business continuity in the event of a crisis.   
 
It has been suggested that effectively implemented Business 
Continuity Management (BCM) practices can lead to the 
generation of High Reliability traits within an airport organisation1. 
                                                 
1
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The presence of High 
Reliability traits in an 
organisation is 
associated with more 
effective operation and 
less likelihood of failure. 
The presence of High Reliability traits in an organisation suggests 
that such complex systems will operate effectively with limited 
likelihood of failure and/or loss of functions from disturbances2. 
Business Continuity practices and High Reliability traits are 
therefore desirable properties for airport operations. However, 
these areas remain under-examined in the academic literature3. 
Traditionally, the issue of continuity and more broadly reliability in 
infrastructure have only been addressed in times of severe and 
highly publicised events, such as Chernobyl, Three Mile Island or 
the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, and specific studies on 
continuity in relation to airports are even fewer in number. Thus, 
the application of BCM and High Reliability Theory specifically in 
aviation and airports is under addressed. It is on this basis that this 
current paper seeks to more closely explore and examine the role 
of BCM in creating High Reliability traits in airports.  
 
The following question is central to this issue:  
Can Business Continuity Management practices create High 
Reliability traits in airports? 
The paper addresses this question in sections:  
 Section 1: Key concepts and theories that form the 
foundation of business continuity management and high 
reliability theory. Key concepts include threat, 
vulnerability, risk, crisis, business continuity management 
and business continuity planning. Key theories include 
Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability Theory. 
 Section 2: The notion of critical infrastructure and airports 
as socio-technical systems. 
 Section 3: Potential links between Business Continuity 
                                                 
2
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Management and High Reliability Theory.  
 Section 4: Potential applications of High Reliability Theory 
to airports. 
 
 
Section 1: Key Concepts & Theories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Only if a threat is 
perceived as 
significant, can 
countermeasures be 
implemented in time. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Threat 
Before examining Business Continuity Management and its role in 
creating High Reliability Organisations, it is imperative to articulate 
how the basic terms and concepts in this field of study are defined 
and understood. The concept of threat is perhaps the most 
foundational when it comes to discussing crises and business 
continuity. A threat (or hazard) is a source, activity or situation that 
could potentially cause harm, danger or loss and it may stem from 
natural phenomena such as earthquakes and floods or from 
intentional activities such as fire and sabotage. When humans 
perceive a threat, they generally react with one of the four basic 
strategies: fight, flight, play dead or experimentation4. However, the 
reaction to threat greatly depends on the subjective perception of 
that threat. If a threat is perceived to be insignificant, then an 
organisation cannot prepare or respond to that threat. If, however, a 
threat is perceived and recognised as significant, individual 
countermeasures and defensive strategies can be put into place5. If 
realised, the impact of a threat on an organisation depends on the 
vulnerability of the organisation to that particular threat as well as a 
range of other factors.  
 
1.2 Vulnerability 
Despite its potential implications for organisational failure, the 
notion of vulnerability has not received a great deal of attention in 
                                                 
4
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5
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academic literature6. Vulnerability refers to the “intrinsic properties 
of something resulting in susceptibility to a risk source that can lead 
to an event with a consequence”7. A risk source can be tangible or 
intangible and represents the element with the intrinsic potential to 
create loss or disturbance8. Vulnerability can also be defined “as a 
susceptibility to change or loss because of existing organisational or 
functional practices or conditions”9. Smith (2005) considers 
vulnerability to embody one of the key factors in crisis management 
as by definition a crisis “exposes the inherent vulnerability that has 
been embedded within the system over time”10. He has developed a 
model for embedded ‘Pathways of Vulnerability’ across the phases of 
a crisis, which depicts how vulnerability is embedded into 
organisations in several ways (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Smith’s Pathways of Vulnerability 
 
According to this model, organisations by habit and practice enable 
propensity for failure within their system processes which lie hidden 
for a certain time period, until a point is reached where conditions 
change and the hidden pathways along with the new climate result in 
failure11. Often, the organisation’s vulnerabilities remain unnoticed 
                                                 
6
 Smith, 2005 
7
 Standards Australia, 2010 
8
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9
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10
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11
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at first such that through “coupling” and “interactive complexity”12, 
these weaknesses continue to corrode undiscovered until it is likely 
to escalate into a crisis13. Scholars seem to agree that organisational 
crises occur when a vulnerable systems is triggered into some spiral 
of unfavourable dynamics14. However, the presence of vulnerability 
in itself does not explain if a crisis will occur as even the simplest of 
organisations that operate in a favourable environment can 
experience failure
15
. Further appreciation of the wider context of 
vulnerability requires a detailed understanding of the concept of risk. 
 
1.3 Risk & Crisis 
‘Risk’ is a mental construct due to the fact that considerations about 
risk as a potential for loss are instigated in the human mind16. The 
perception of risk may differ from person to person and is contingent 
upon experience and personal judgment17. In the everyday use of the 
words, there appears to be significant overlap between crisis and the 
associated terms of disaster and risk18. Risk has been defined as the 
effect of uncertainty on objectives and is often articulated in terms of 
being a function of the likelihood of an event times the consequences 
of that event19. Risks are low probability / high impact events which 
may cause significant damage to an organisation20. Risk management 
can be viewed as activities which try to manage and control risk 
issues at an operational level21. The risk management process 
commonly involves identifying, assessing and judging levels of risk, 
assigning ownership for taking actions to mitigate or anticipate the 
causes, and monitoring and reviewing progress of any risk reduction 
                                                 
12
 Perrow, 1984 
13
 Smith, 2005 
14
 Boin, 2006 
15
 Boin, 2006 
16
 Renn & Graham, 2006 
17
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18
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19
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20
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Risk and crisis should 
be considered as 
belonging to the 
same continuum 
whereby risk a sub-
set of a much larger 
crisis framework. 
Unmanaged risks 
thus potentially lead 
to crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
strategies22.  
 
Crisis on the other hand can be described as “a damaging event, or 
series of events, that display emergent properties which exceed an 
organisation’s abilities to cope with the task demands that it 
generated and has implications that can affect a considerable 
proportion of the organisation as well as other bodies”23. Crises can 
typically be characterised in terms of place, time, emergence and 
scale and are generally triggered by some combination of 
circumstances that expose the intrinsic vulnerability within a system 
or organisation24. As such, a crisis represents a situation that is 
beyond the capability of everyday management processes to handle 
successfully and may result in unexpected costs in terms of time and 
resources25. When it comes to contrasting risk and crisis, Smith 
(2006a) is of the view that risk is a sub-set of a much larger crisis 
framework so that unmanaged risks can potentially lead to a crisis 
situation. For this reason, he stresses that organisations should 
regard risk and crisis as belonging to the same continuum instead of 
considering them as two separate concepts.  
 
While risk management has often been understood as a task to 
identify potential problems, crisis management is frequently viewed 
as a function focused on the management of the crisis event once it 
has occurred26. Many organisations equate crisis management with 
the process of business continuity management as it involves 
planning to cope with crisis situations once they have occurred27. A 
more detailed discussion relating to business continuity management 
will be presented later. The process of crisis management most often 
involves some extent of planning, acute response, recovery and 
                                                 
22
 Renn & Graham, 2006, p.152 
23
 Smith, 2006a, p.7 
24
 Smith, 2006a 
25
 Standards Australia, 2010 
26
 Smith, 2006a 
27
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Successful crisis 
management 
requires customised 
action programs 
tailored to the 
specific 
characteristics of the 
industry, 
environment and 
organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
organisational learning strategies as well as strategies to protect 
organisational assets28. In order to be successful, crisis management 
requires customised action programs tailored to the specific 
characteristics of the industry, environment and organisation29. 
While these crisis management actions enable an organisation to 
deal with a crisis event, they do not ward off the crisis from 
happening so that significant and irreversible damage may still 
occur30. It is for this reason that Smith (2005) argues that crisis 
management should comprise some form of crisis prevention 
framework, for example by creating increased organisational 
resilience. Resilience is a defensive strategy against hazards or crises 
which enables an organisation to return to a stable state after a crisis 
event, for example, by decreasing vulnerability and developing 
flexible response alternatives31. At this point it should be noted, 
however, that no matter what kind of crisis management or 
resilience strategy an organisation has in place, preventing every 
single unexpected crisis or threatening event is not realistic and 
simply impossible32. The following section on Business Continuity 
Management will highlight the importance of having strategies in 
place to cope with such unexpected and unpreventable crises by 
avoiding long-term breakdowns of a system and ensuring the 
continuance of business processes and functions. 
 
1.4 Business Continuity Management 
Business Continuity Management (BCM) draws from both disaster 
recovery and crisis management theory33 and is a “proactive and 
holistic management process designed to facilitate the continued 
achievement of critical business objectives”34. BCM, in reality, is an 
                                                 
28
 Boin & McConnell, 2007; Smith, 2005 
29
 Pearson & Mitroff, 1993 
30
 Smith, 2005 
31
 Renn & Graham, 2006 
32
 Boin & McConnell, 2007 
33
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34
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BCM is an applied risk 
management practice 
and a successful 
implementation 
enables an 
organisation to 
develop increased 
confidence in its 
processes, services 
and outputs in the 
face of risk. 
 
 
BCM should be 
conducted as a result 
of the risk 
management process 
which provides the 
priorities to be 
addressed in BCM. 
 
 
 
 
 
The primary goal of 
BCP should be the 
recovery and 
continuity of the most 
critical business 
processes. 
 
applied risk management practice and can be regarded as a tool 
which, if used effectively, offers increased confidence that 
organisational processes, services and outputs can be realised in the 
face of increased risk35. The implementation of BCM practices further 
helps organisations to identify and manage the vulnerabilities and 
incidents which could potentially disrupt or damage critical business 
processes, alleviate the impact of these risks and ensures that 
business processes are recovered without too much delay36. 
Therefore, BCM represents a major opportunity for organisations to 
protect themselves against risks37 and more than that, having BCM 
strategies in place additionally influences societal resilience through 
a continuity of employment, services and the contributions to the 
economy38. In order to be carried out successfully, BCM should be 
conducted as a result of the risk management process39 as risk 
management provides the needs and priorities which should to be 
addressed in the BCM process40. Adequate financial and human 
resources as well as managerial acceptance are other imperative 
elements to effectively implement BCM41. The specific BCM process 
should vary from organisation to organisation as they face different 
risks and have different critical business processes and resources 
which need to be recovered immediately after a crisis42.  
 
The notion of Business Continuity Planning (BCP) more closely 
describes the procedures involved in implementing BCM. The 
objective of BCP is to ensure that critical business processes and 
outputs are recovered and continued within an acceptable time 
frame after the crisis event so that they can be continued as usual43. 
                                                 
35
 Gibb & Buchanan, 2006 
36
 Paton, 2009 
37
 Gibb & Buchanan, 2006 
38
 Paton, 2009 
39
 Camastral, 2009 
40
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41
 Paton, 2009 
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 Botha & Von Solms, 2004; Smith & Sherwood, 1995 
Airports of the Future 
© 2010 QUT 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is vital that 
executive managers 
support and 
understand the 
processes of BCP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This objective is achieved by adopting a total system view and 
assessing and preparing for incidents which may disrupt 
organisational processes44. If successful, BCP facilitates the 
preservation of essential customer service, revenue generation, 
essential support services, customer confidence, shareholder 
confidence, employee confidence and the public image of the 
organisation which in turn can provide the organisation with a 
competitive advantage45. BCP can thus ensure that an organisation 
recovers from disaster quickly and effectively and that disruption is 
minimised. However, similarly to BCM, BCP needs executive 
understanding and support to be successfully implemented46.  Now 
that the foundational terms of threat, vulnerability, risk, crisis and 
business continuity management have been discussed, the paper will 
go on to examine Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability Theory 
as they represent significant contributions towards a better 
understanding of organisational crises and the notion of reliability in 
organisations.  
 
1.5 Normal Accident Theory 
Both Normal Accident Theory (NAT) and High Reliability Theory (HRT) 
have developed around high threat technologies within organisations 
with considerable potential for accidents or significant failure47. The 
notion of ‘normal’ accidents was first developed by Charles Perrow in 
1984 when he proposed a theory to generalise the causes of the 
disaster at Three Mile Island48. The theory emphasises the aspects of 
interactive complexity and tight coupling. Interactive complexity 
refers to the ability of one system component to interact with other 
components outside the normal sequence while coupling relates to 
the degree of dependence among components49. Due to the 
                                                 
44
 Herbane, Elliott, & Swartz, 1997 
45
 Herbane et al., 1997 
46
 Savage, 2002 
47
 Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008 
48
 Weick et al., 2008 
49
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presence of tightly coupled processes and interactive complexity in 
the Three Mile Island system, Perrow (1984) put forward the 
proposal that any organisation which is characterised by tight 
coupling and interactive complexity would experience accidents in 
the normal course of operations. The reasoning behind this is that 
complexity can create unexpected interactions and within a tightly 
coupled system, these unexpected interactions can rapidly escalate 
and result is system breakdown50. Accidents in complex and tightly 
coupled systems are thus considered to be inevitable under the NAT 
view. Organisations which are loosely coupled on the other hand 
possess the capability to absorb unexpected shock without 
destabilising the entire system51. Similarly, organisations which are 
less complex are unlikely to experience unexpected interactions 
between system components. Therefore, Perrow (1984) argues that 
only if an organisation reduces either the tight coupling or the 
interactive complexity within the system can the potential for 
catastrophic failure be reduced.  
 
In contrast to NAT and the proposition that accidents in complex and 
tightly coupled organisations are normal and inevitable, an 
alternative theory has been developed which suggests that accidents 
are in fact preventable when the organisation possesses high 
reliability traits. This alternative theory has become known as High 
Reliability Theory (HRT). Normal accident theorists such as Perrow 
and Sagan have strongly criticised HRT for its single minded quest for 
safety and there has since been much vigorous debate about the 
validity and appropriateness of the two opposing frameworks52. HRT 
will now be defined and analysed in more detail.  
 
1.6 High Reliability Theory 
Before looking at the theory of High Reliability, it appears worthwhile 
                                                 
50
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Organisational 
reliability should be 
evaluated based on 
the consistency of 
organisational output 
while taking into 
account differing 
environment 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to firstly define what exactly is meant by the term ‘reliability’.  
Organisational reliability has commonly been understood as the 
“unusual capacity to produce collective outcomes of a certain 
minimum quality repeatedly”; thought to be achieved through the 
establishment of standardised routines53. In contrast, Schulman 
(1993) proposes that organisational reliability is in fact not a result of 
invariance and routines but a result of effective management 
strategies to cope with occurring fluctuations in important 
organisational relationships and practices. As such, there is some 
disagreement with regards to how organisational reliability is 
created, however, there is agreement that reliability can be observed 
in the consistency of organisational output even with varying 
environment conditions.  
 
NAT developed as a result of scholars studying organisations or 
systems which have experienced failure54. In contrast, HRT took 
shape as an outcome of examining organisations which should be 
prone to failure but have experienced extraordinary levels of safety 
and productive capacity55. These organisations which maintain 
complex and tightly coupled systems without failure incidents as well 
as maintaining their capacity for production have become known as 
Highly Reliable Organisations (HROs). Examples of HROs include air 
traffic control systems, electric power generators and nuclear aircraft 
carriers56. These systems operate in unforgiving social and political 
environments with great potential for error and significant 
consequences of failure57. HRT, which developed from closely 
examining these HROs, argues that certain organisational 
characteristics and processes can reduce an organisation’s exposure 
to risk while maintaining reliability and the capability to meet 
                                                 
53
 Hannan & Freeman, 1984, cited in Weick et al., 2008 
54
 LaPorte, 1996 
55
 LaPorte, 1996 
56
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57
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Every organisation 
should strive to 
develop and promote 
organisational 
reliability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
production goals58. It is very difficult to sustain and explain the 
phenomenon of HROs as their lack of accidents is theoretically 
inexplicable59. It should be noted that HROs are not completely 
immune to crisis events but because they enable an organisation to 
improve resilience levels through promoting overall reliability, the 
attainment of HR traits is generally desirable for any organisation60. 
Resilience is the capability of a system exposed to hazards to return 
to an overall stable state after deflection of perturbation61. 
 
HROs have not received a significant amount of attention in the 
mainstream organisational literature which may potentially be due to 
the perception that the notion of HROs is exotic, rare and not 
generalisable to other organisations in different environments62. 
Increasing the focus on HROs within the mainstream literature may 
improve the awareness among traditional organisations as to what it 
takes to establish reliable traits63. Much of the research that has 
been done on HROs has focused on the structure, characteristics, 
operating dynamics and costs of HROs such as the studies conducted 
by Bruijne (2006), Clarke (1993), LaPorte (1996), Roberts (1990), 
Sagan (1993) and Weick (1987). As a complete literature review of 
HRT and HROs lies outside the scope of this paper, Table 1 
summarises some of the key research that examines the 
characteristics of HROs.  
 
The research findings presented in Table 1 depict some degree of 
overlap in terms of HRO characteristics, suggesting that the various 
HROs studied across these research projects did in fact display similar 
traits and processes which on review would appear to ‘protect’ them 
from ‘accidents’. It has become evident that while the two theories 
                                                 
58
 LaPorte, 1996  
59
 LaPorte, 1996 
60
 Smith, 2006b, p.107 
61
 Renn & Graham, 2006 
62
 Weick et al., 2008 
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It is advantageous for 
crisis managers to 
have an 
understanding of 
both NAT and HRT as 
they present 
insightful frameworks 
for organisational 
failure, hazards and 
reliability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
promote two very contrasting viewpoints, both NAT and HRT present 
insightful frameworks for organisational failure, hazards and 
reliability and have focused the academic attention on organisational 
traits, processes and culture which play a role in accidents64. Rijpma 
(1997) took on the challenge of evaluating the debate between NAT 
and HRT by examining possible connections between the two 
theories. 
 
The author studied the effects complexity and tight coupling have on 
reliability and vice versa and concludes that complexity and tight 
coupling have mixed effects on overall reliability65. On the one hand, 
complexity and tight coupling enhance reliability by increasing 
redundancy and slack but on the other hand, complexity and tight 
coupling sometimes decrease the reliability of organisational 
strategies. As such, no clear relationship could be determined 
between the two theories and the debate between the two schools 
of thought continue.  Before considering the potential links between 
BCM and HRT, the concept of critical infrastructures will first be 
discussed to gain a better appreciation for workings and complexity 
of airports as part of the wider critical infrastructure system.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64
 Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009 
65
 Rijpma, 1997 
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Table 1- Summaries of key literature examining HRO traits 
Author(s) Findings / Conceptualisation of Highly Reliable Organisations 
LaPorte (1996) 
 
LaPorte describes the findings from the Berkley HRO project, which investigated the internal and external properties of HROs. 
 
Internal HRO properties include:  
 Strong sense of mission and goals stressing production capacity and reliability in operations equally 
 The operating environment is characterised by technical and social interdependence, high technical competence 
 High operational performance; Structural flexibility and redundancy 
 Functional authority relationships; Decision making is decentralised 
 Decisions are executed quickly; Continuous search for system improvement 
 Rewarding the discovery and reporting of error; Safety Culture 
 
External HRO properties include: 
 The external support for achieving the internal conditions of trustworthiness is the most important of all the properties of HROs 
 Aggressive, knowledgeable watch groups increase the likelihood that reliability enhancing operations/ investment will be seen as legitimate by corporate 
and regulatory actors 
 Strong presence of external stakeholder groups 
 
Bruijne (2006) 
 
Bruijne identified 9 HR traits which can be applied to critical infrastructure systems: 
 Commitment to reliable operations in missions and goals 
 Sustained high technical performance 
 Structural flexibility and redundancy 
 High degrees of responsibility and accountability 
 Flexible decision making processes 
 Continual search for system improvement and training for worst case scenarios 
 Reliability not considered marginalisable – cannot be traded off 
 Organisational culture of reliability 
 Strong presence of external groups with access to credible and timely information 
 
Weick et al. (2008) 
 
Weick et al. have developed five means to counter normal accidents: 
 pre-occupation with failure 
 reluctance to simplify interpretations 
 sensitivity to operations                                                     Mindfulness 
 commitment to resilience 
 underspecified structuring 
Airports of the Future 
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Infrastructure comprises the physical assets and technology which 
contribute to the maintenance of organisational functioning66 
while the term critical infrastructures (CIs) refers to “those 
physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and 
communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or 
rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly 
impact upon the social or economic well-being of the nation”67. 
CIs are commonly characterised by interconnectedness, 
complexity, multi-purpose, spatial dispersion and dynamic 
environments and consist of interdependent, diverse and reliant 
sub-systems68. It is these latter features that make CIs vulnerable 
to disruptions, damage and breakdowns and which increase the 
importance of protecting and ensuring the reliability and 
continuity of supply. The growing dependence of modern society 
on the effective functioning of CI networks further amplifies this 
need for reliability69, or in other words, the need for resilience of 
operations and the ability to handle or recover from crisis70. 
Reliability implies that there is relatively little variation in the 
output of the CI, particularly from the perspective of the 
consumer71. This reliability can, however, be disrupted by both 
natural and deliberate disasters which then potentially cascade 
across other systems due to the interconnectedness and mutual 
dependence72. Take for example the European infrastructure 
system which spans across many regions and country borders. 
While this has significantly increased the effectiveness and 
efficiency of European infrastructure, it also makes it more 
                                                 
66
 Standards Australia, 2010 
67
 Pye & Warren, 2006, p.3 
68
 Pye & Warren, 2006; Schulman & Roe, 2007 
69
 Boin & McConnell, 2007 
70
 Schulman & Roe, 2007 
71
 Schulman & Roe, 2007 
72
 LaPorte, 2007 
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The actual management 
of CIs is critical for 
achieving increased 
reliability within the 
system, probably more 
so than the design of CIs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vulnerable to cascading failure at the same time73. Limiting these 
kinds of failures is thus not only imperative due to the potential 
harm it causes the economy and society but also due to the 
potential spreading of a crisis across other CIs.  
 
Some scholars have argued that improved reliability can be 
achieved through better CI system design74 as it is commonly 
agreed that complexity and tight coupling of system components 
can lead to the effects of a small crisis escalating throughout the 
wider system75. Schulman and Roe (2007), however, are of the 
view that increased reliability lies primarily in the management of 
these CIs, not necessarily in the design. LaPorte (2007) seems to 
support this view as he suggests two main strategies for CI 
management to prepare for untoward surprises. These strategies 
involve firstly planning and formulating competent responses to 
potential incidents which can be imagined and secondly to put in 
place institutional capacities to deal with unforseen crises which 
could devastate the system. Boin and McConnell (2007) note that 
even this planning process may have inherent vulnerabilities such 
as bureaucratic policies and inconsistent coordination across 
systems. It is therefore evident that significantly more research is 
needed on the reliability of infrastructures as well as on the 
managerial approaches to facilitate increased reliability.  
 
3.1 Airports as CI and Socio-Technical Systems 
Airports are typical examples of large and complex critical 
infrastructure systems76 and yet are themselves elements within 
larger critical transport infrastructure systems. As it is difficult to 
determine and measure the contributions and influence of 
                                                 
73
 Frizon, Ljungkvist, Boin, & Rhinard, 2007 
74
 Perrow, 1999; Farrell, Lave, & Morgan, 2002 
75
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and disturbances should 
not only be examined in 
the technical system but 
also in the human 
management of these 
technical systems.  
 
 
 
 
 
individual system parts, the discipline of systems’ thinking 
attempts to better understand the complexity and dynamics of 
relationships within the system. Pye and Warren (2006) argue that 
CI networks display the characteristics of such complex and 
dynamic systems as they are made up of various components with 
interdependent relationships. Another valuable means to analyse 
an airport system is by looking at it as a socio-technical system. 
The concept of socio-technical systems (STS) describes a system 
which is made up of two jointly independent but correlative 
interactive systems – the social and the technical system77. The 
technical component refers to the processes and technology 
required to create outputs while the social system relates to 
people, relationships among people and authority structures78. 
This approach seeks to place equal weight of consideration on 
both the social and the technical aspect of a system in an effort to 
gain a comprehensive picture of the system as a whole79. The STS 
lens further emphasises that the potential for threats and 
disturbances is not only inherent in the technical system but also 
in the human management of these technical systems80. In fact, it 
has been argued that the great majority of factors which 
contribute to large scale technical disasters are social81 and that 
disasters such as the Chernobyl and Challenger space shuttle 
disasters could have been prevented if the human operators had 
been better prepared for potential crises converging on both 
decision making and technical factors82.  
 
Failures of socio-technical systems have received increasing 
attention in the academic literature over an extended period of 
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It is vital that an airport 
assesses the suitability 
and alignment of 
technical controls and 
linked administration 
and managerial controls. 
 
 
 
 
 
time. This is because such occurrences are increasing, society 
heavily relies on these systems, they are generally heavily 
publicised and have the potential to match natural disasters in 
terms of scale of consequences83. ST disasters happen when 
human, organisational and technological systems break down and 
result in significant economic and social cost as well as damage to 
human life84. The magnitude of the consequences of many ST 
disasters rapidly makes them ‘household’ names85. These 
disasters are different from commercial crises in that they 
generally occur suddenly, emerging from the interplay of complex 
technology and human use of this technology. This combination is 
considered to play a critical role in causing the disaster and they 
have the potential to destroy human lives86. It is thus a valuable 
approach to consider airports not only as CI systems but also as 
socio-technical systems as this amplifies the significance of the 
consequences of airport disturbances and further stresses the 
importance of considering technical controls as well as 
appropriate administrative and managerial controls87.  
 
Now that the key concepts, notions and theories necessary for 
analysing the relationship between BCM practices and high 
reliability traits have been defined, this paper will now examine 
potential theoretical connections between BCM and HRT 
concepts. 
 
Section 3: Potential Links between HRT and BCM 
 
 
There has been limited research conducted on the relationship or 
links between HRT and BCM. As such, it is not well understood if 
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Some BCM elements can 
be directly linked to HRO 
characteristics, 
emphasising the 
importance of effective 
BCM practices in 
airports. 
and how BCM can facilitate the generation of HR traits within 
organisations. This suggests that there remains a significant gap in 
the general understanding and there appear to be many 
opportunities to more closely examine this relationship in future 
research. The thesis by Camastral (2009) is one of the few studies 
investigating BCM components which facilitate the generation of 
HR traits. As shown in Table 2, this work details that there are 
some BCM elements with a direct theoretical relationship to HRO 
characteristics (Category A) while others have a weaker yet 
existing connection to HRO traits (Category B).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2- BCM elements with a theoretical relationship to HR traits (Camastral, 2009) 
 
 
BCM HR TRAIT 
Category A: strong relationship 
Top management commitment to 
BCM 
Top management support of 
reliability 
Training and practical exercises 
Trigger points for BCM review 
Regular review of BCM 
Identification of system weaknesses 
Training for worst-case scenarios and 
constant search for system 
improvement 
Communication with key 
stakeholders 
Communication outside the 
organisation 
Ongoing stakeholder 
communications 
Internal and external 
communications established 
Presence of external groups 
(regulatory bodies) with access to 
timely and credible information 
Emergency response 
Continuity strategies 
Recovery phase 
Redundancy and flexibility in 
systems and processes 
Category B: present relationship 
Organisational awareness 
Situational awareness 
Sustained high technical 
performance 
Emergency response 
Continuity strategies 
Recovery phase 
Centralised decision-making with 
operator flexibility and protection 
built into design 
Airports of the Future 
© 2010 QUT 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An airport should aim to 
achieve organisation-
wide ‘mindfulness’, 
through the 
encouragement of 
preoccupation with 
failure, reluctance to 
simplify, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment 
to resilience and under-
specification of 
structures. Mindfulness 
facilitates reliability. 
Particularly the BCM activities with a direct relationship to HR 
traits emphasise the potential impact of applying business 
continuity strategies, if implemented and sustained well, in order 
to create a more highly reliable organisation. Considering the 
similarity and parallelism between the described BCM activities 
and the traits of a highly reliable organisation, it is rather 
astonishing that this relationship has not received more research 
attention and it evidently leaves much scope for further research. 
One possibility is to examine further direct and indirect links 
between BCM and HRT based on previous research in these two 
areas of study. The research conducted by Weick et al. (2008), for 
example, which describes five organisational characteristics 
distinguishing HROs from other organisations, could be 
investigated with regards to potential connections to BCM 
practices. These five traits detailed in Weick et al. (2008), 
preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment to resilience, and under-specification of 
structures, represent the ways in which HROs think and act 
differently to less reliable organisations88. This suite of traits has 
been referred to as being ‘mindful’ of the potential for 
disturbances and enhanced risk awareness. As can be seen in 
Figure 2, this mindfulness in turn then facilitates the attainment of 
high reliability traits. Are there any theoretical connections 
between the five characteristics defined by Weick et al. (2008) and 
BCM/ BCP practices? 
 
 
                                                 
88
 Weick, 2001, cited in Hopkins, 2007 
Airports of the Future 
© 2010 QUT 
23 
 
 
Figure 2- Traits facilitating mindfulness and reliability (Weick et al., 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The processes and 
practices of BCM and 
mindfulness show some 
overlap, highlighting 
once more the 
importance of effective 
BCM in airports for the 
attainment of 
mindfulness and HR 
traits. 
 
Although this current paper is by no means a comprehensive 
attempt to analyse and evaluate the overlap or symmetry 
between BCM and Weick’s model of mindfulness and HROs, some 
ideas and suggestions of how the two theories might be linked are 
presented in Table 3. These suggestions are merely based on a 
comparison of the descriptions of effective BCM/ BCP practices, 
HRO traits and the descriptions of the five mindfulness traits.  
 
Nevertheless, the comparison appears to imply that some overlap 
exists between the processes and practices implied in BCM/ BCP 
and mindfulness traits which would lead to the logical conclusion 
that effectively implemented BCM/BCP practices can in fact also 
facilitate the attainment of mindfulness and as a result facilitate 
HR traits.  
 
There is some evidence that the discipline of BCM/ BCP is not yet 
well understood among top management or organisational 
strategists89. This could imply that there is probably even less of 
an appreciation for the potential of BCM and mindfulness to 
generate and sustain HR traits within organisations.  
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Mindfulness Traits HR Traits BCM/ BCP Practices 
Preoccupation with Failure 
- sensitive to early signs of 
failure 
- well developed systems for 
reporting near misses, process 
upsets and small and localised 
failures of all sorts 
- alert to warnings and dangers
90
 
 
- Top management support of 
reliability 
- Training for worst-case 
scenarios and constant search 
for system improvement 
- Top management commitment 
to BCM 
- CEO support, understanding 
and enthusiasm for BCP
91
 
- Regular testing and simulations 
of BCP plans  
- Identifying major risks to 
business interruptions
92
  
Reluctance to Simplify 
Interpretations 
- deliberate steps to create more 
complete and nuanced pictures 
through information 
- treat redundancy as vital for 
the collection and 
interpretation of information
93
  
- Presence of external groups 
with access to timely and 
credible information 
- Redundancy and flexibility in 
systems and processes 
 
- Communication with key 
stakeholders 
- Communication outside the 
organisation 
- Ongoing stakeholder 
communications- 
- Internal and external 
communications established 
Sensitivity to Operations 
- front line operators maintain 
situational awareness, or 
sensitivity to operations
94
  
- front line operators are highly 
informed about operations as a 
whole 
- Sustained high technical 
performance 
- Organisational awareness 
- Situational awareness 
 
 
Commitment to Resilience 
- HROs work on the assumption 
that errors will occur and they 
put in place back-up systems to 
catch and correct errors. A 
commitment to resilience is 
actually a commitment to learn 
from error
95
  
 
- Training for worst-case 
scenarios and constant search 
for system improvement 
- Top management commitment 
to BCM 
- Identification of system 
weaknesses Emergency 
response 
- Continuity strategies 
- Training and practical exercises 
- Trigger points for BCM review 
- Regular review of BCM 
- BCP philosophy embedded in 
the operating activities
96 
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Under-specification of Structures 
- When operations are being 
carried out at very high tempo, 
decisions “migrate” to the 
people with the greatest 
expertise or knowledge about 
the events in question
97
 
 Decentralised decision making 
- Redundancy and flexibility in 
systems and processes 
- Centralised decision-making 
with operator flexibility and 
protection built into design 
- Synthesis of BCP awareness in 
the entire corporate structure
98
  
- Bureaucratic flexibility99 
Table 3- Theoretical Relationships between Mindfulness traits, HR traits and BCM/BCP 
practices (developed for this paper) 
 
 
 It is vital that this relationship is more closely addressed and 
researched, so that the value of conducting BCM in facilitating a 
more reliable organisation can be clearly established and 
communicated to organisational managers. As this paper is 
specifically interested in the application of BCM and HRT to 
airports, the next section will address the application of HRT to 
airports. 
 
 
Section 4: Potential Applications of HRT to Airports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the last decade, there has been heightened interest among 
theorists as well as practitioners over the safety and reliability of 
critical infrastructures and hazardous socio-technical systems in 
the face of increasingly uncertain environments and threats of 
terrorist attacks100. The events of September 11 have raised 
particular concerns about the reliability and security of air travel 
which has already resulted in increasing investments being made 
into air travel reliability101. The vulnerabilities of critical 
                                                 
97
 Hopkins, 2007 
98
 Herbane et al., 1997 
99
 Paton, 2009 
100
 Egan, 2007; Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002; Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Schulman, Roe, van Eeten, & de Bruijne, 
2004 
101
 Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002 
Airports of the Future 
© 2010 QUT 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Airports need to be 
viewed as a part of the 
complex CI system as 
well as a socio-technical 
system which is prone to 
technical and human 
errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
infrastructure systems such as communications, transportation 
and electricity supply are plentiful and diverse, yet it is on 
obligation of providers to continuously provide critical and reliable 
services in a dynamic and turbulent environment102. While some 
elements of critical infrastructure, such as electricity and 
telecommunications, and some specialised types of dangerous 
socio-technical systems, such as nuclear aircraft carriers, have 
been investigated in terms of their potential for failure as well as 
their vulnerabilities103, high reliability in airports has not received 
a significant amount of attention in the literature.  
 
As mentioned earlier, airports are typical examples of large and 
complex critical infrastructure systems which need to be 
considered firstly as one element of a wider and interconnected 
critical infrastructure system104 and secondly as a socio-technical 
system with threats inherent in both the technical and social 
system components105. Section 2 of this paper on critical 
infrastructure and socio-technical systems has emphasised the 
importance of avoiding failures and minimising the consequences 
of potential incidents within these systems. Airports further play a 
significant role beyond that of a transport node and as part of the 
wider transportation infrastructure, as they have significant 
impacts on a national economy both as a substantial employer 
and site of commercial activity. For these reasons, the 
maintenance of functional reliability at airports is a critical goal106 
and it is essential that an airport has the capability to convalesce 
from any disruptions in functionality in order to continue the 
provision of critical services and commercial activities. Given the 
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Complexity and tight-
coupling have been 
found to be significant 
facilitators of high 
reliability in electricity 
infrastructure systems 
and therefore should be 
considered in airport 
systems as well.  
 
 
 
 
limited coverage of high reliability theory and practice in airports, 
consideration of studies conducted on other CI systems and 
reliability provides a context for better appreciation of the 
challenges of airport settings. Table 4 details some recent items 
from the literature on characteristics, demands and operating 
environments in various CI systems, it may be possible to use 
these findings as a foundation for future research on high 
reliability in airports. 
 
The research on reliability in critical infrastructure systems is still 
in its early stages and there are currently only limited empirical 
studies in this area. As the summaries in Table 4 suggest, the 
studies that have been conducted investigate very different 
matters and depict diverse perspectives and viewpoints, none of 
which are well understood and most of which do not consider 
airport systems. Nevertheless, these papers highlight some 
potentially significant considerations which may be of importance 
when studying reliability specifically in the context of airports and 
aviation systems. For example, the study by Schulman et al. (2004) 
found that complexity and tight-coupling are in fact significant 
facilitators of high reliability in an electricity infrastructure system 
and were not found to be causes of ‘normal accidents’ as 
suggested by Perrow (1984). This raises the question whether 
these findings also apply to airport systems. Similarly, it would be 
interesting to investigate whether the eight ingredients 
framework for communications infrastructure systems used by 
Rauscher et al. (2006) could be applied to airport systems. 
 
The article by Macwan et al. (2006), in particular, presents a great 
opportunity to expand the current knowledge into high reliability 
in airports as the development of a measurement tool with 
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specific reliability measures for airports would significantly 
increase the understanding and insight into what exactly it is that 
can make an airport reliable and how ‘reliability’ varies across 
different airports. It is evident from a review of current literature 
on CI systems and high reliability that much future research is 
needed to understand how reliability in airports can be 
conceptualised, measured and improved. 
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4.1 Current Research on CI Systems and High Reliability 
Authors Focus of Research 
Schulman, Roe, van 
Eeten, & de Bruijne 
(2004) 
 
 
 Research question: How do CIs, many with competing, if not conflicting goals and interests, provide highly reliable service in the absence of ongoing 
command and control and in the presence of rapidly changing task environments with highly consequential hazards? 
 Analyse an electricity infrastructure system in California as a specific case 
Findings: 
- This case study offers a challenge to the NAT notion of ‘complex interactivity and tight coupling’ as an inevitable source of normal accidents in large technical 
systems. In this electricity critical infrastructure, complexity and tightly coupling actually can be important resources for high reliability management. 
- Complexity allows for multiple strategies of resilience. The system’s tightly-coupled choke points positions operators to see the whole system against a 
backdrop of alternatives, options, improvisations and counter-strategy. 
- Important implications for HRT and the future management of CIs 
Rauscher, Krock, 
Runyon (2006) 
 
 
 Systems require a comprehensive and systematic analysis to identify the underlying components. In the communications infrastructure using a framework of 
eight core components can do this: human, policy, hardware, software, networks, payload, environment and power. 
 The authors analyse the opportunities of using these eight components in a vulnerability analysis as a means for enhancing reliability and security of the 
communications infrastructure. 
Findings: 
- Using the eight components, vulnerability analysis helps to protect against unimagined and unknown attacks. By identifying the finite number of 
vulnerabilities within a system, one can effectively protect the communications network from known threats, and from those that have not yet seen before.  
- The major benefit of systematically addressing the vulnerabilities of a system is that protection is provided for general classes of problems, independent of 
knowing what the specific threat may be. 
- The eight components of communications infrastructure have been successfully used over the past several years by various corporations, and national and 
government advisory groups which have developed hundreds of best practices. 
De Bruijne & van 
Eeten (2007) 
 
 Outline the consequences of institutional restructuring for the changing ways in which CIs ensure the reliability and security of their networks and services.  
 Investigate the implications of these findings for CI protection. 
Findings: 
- Conclude that current CIP protection efforts seem very vulnerable in the light of institutional fragmentation and networked forms of reliability. 
- Neither Normal Accident Theory nor High- Reliability Theory can account for reliability under these conditions.  
Egan (2007) 
 
 
 Examines the characteristics of new technologies or services that are becoming a part of the CI, but are not yet.  
 Attempts to systematically define the characteristics of ‘criticality’ in order to better anticipate the types of vulnerabilities these new technologies or services 
create. 
Findings: 
- The drive to hyper-efficiency and the privatization of many CI capacities has reduced resilience in many systems, thus making the systems more vulnerable to 
increasing criticality. 
- A method of encouraging CI entities to better anticipate future vulnerability is to develop a model of risk management based on ‘institutional stewardship’. 
This concept arises from the legal notion that when one places another at risk, one is obligated to aid the other until they are safe. 
- It may be effective to establish liability rules based on the notion that organizations should internalise the costs of the risks they produce and that by 
internalising them, they will make wiser choices about the technologies they use. 
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Macwan, Hanmer, 
& Mutha (2006) 
 
 
 
 Examines high reliability across telecommunications providers with the aim of expanding the perspectives and awareness of this topic. 
Findings: 
- Industry standardisation efforts have developed that are related to reliability 
- Procedural reliability seems to be a neglected area even though it contributes significantly to outages and downtime. 
- The Quality Excellence for Suppliers of Telecommunications (QuEST) Forum created the TL9000 measurements, which include various reliability 
measurements such as outage frequency, outage downtime. Each TL9000 compliant company reports their measurements to the QuEST Forum. QuEST 
calculates industry averages for these measurements, with the intent of improving industry performance by having each company review their performance 
against the industry average. 
Conrad, LeClaire, 
O’Reilly, & 
Uzunalioglu (2006) 
 
 Authors present models to quantify the interdependencies of critical infrastructures in the U.S. and evaluate plans to compensate for vulnerabilities (work 
that is currently under way) 
 For example: the CIP/DSS (Critical Infrastructure Protection/ Decision Support System) project and Sandia National Laboratories has developed a risk-
informed decision support system that provides insights for making critical infrastructure protection decisions by considering all critical infrastructures and 
key resources, and their primary interdependencies. 
Findings: 
- Models for inter-infrastructure simulation are currently still being developed. 
- There is still much need for future research, for example in the area of determining the business costs of a system failure. 
 
Table 4- Research approaches and findings with respect to critical infrastructure and reliability. 
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High reliability in 
airports is critical - An 
airport system is 
continuously and 
inherently vulnerable to 
threats and the creation 
of high reliability traits 
can potentially act as a 
barrier against these 
vulnerabilities. 
 
 
To engender reliability, 
airport management 
should promote 
elements such as a 
safety culture, senior 
management support, 
mindfulness, external 
regulatory groups, 
adequate technical and 
managerial controls and 
a commitment to 
resilience. 
Based on the limited information and literature available on the 
topic of high reliability in direct relation to CI systems, the 
following theoretical framework has been developed in an 
attempt to conceptualise and contextualise the notions of threat, 
vulnerability, and reliability with regard to airport systems and in 
particular a set of vulnerability reducing factors that can be 
present. The framework presented in Figure 3 suggests that the 
airport system is continuously and inherently vulnerable to threats 
and that the creation of high reliability traits can potentially act as 
a barrier against these vulnerabilities given there are certain 
processes and practices effectively in place within the airport. 
From details given in Section 3, it can be strongly presumed that 
effectively implemented BCM/ BCP practices within an airport 
represent one of the elements which facilitate the generation of 
HR traits. The literature further suggests that factors such as a 
safety culture, senior management support, mindfulness, external 
regulatory groups, structural flexibility, redundancy, adequate 
technical and managerial controls and commitment to resilience 
further engender reliability traits107. However, as previously 
mentioned more research is necessary to better comprehend the 
relationships between these variables and to be able to answer 
the research question posed in this paper. Options for addressing 
these important relationships are examined in the following 
discussion. 
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Figure 3- Theoretical framework to conceptualise the notions of BCM and reliability in 
airports (developed for this paper) 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper has sought to more closely explore and examine the 
role of business continuity management in creating high reliability 
traits in airports. Based on the research question “Can BCM 
practices create HR traits in airports?” various key concepts, 
theories, approaches and frameworks have been considered. 
However, there has not been sufficient empirical research on the 
potential relationship between BCM and HR traits to be able to 
answer the proposed research question satisfactorily. In fact, a 
review of the literature on high reliability in critical infrastructure 
systems (Section 4.1) shows that many significant gaps in the 
literature remain on this topic. As such, future research is needed 
Threat 
Sources 
Reliability 
Vulnerability Reducing Factors: 
Airport 
(Vulnerability) 
Threat 
Sources 
Threat 
Sources 
 External Regulatory Group 
 Structural flexibility & Redundancy 
 Commitment to Resilience 
 Technical & Managerial Controls 
 BCM / BCP 
 Safety Culture & Training 
 Top Management support of BCM 
 Mindfulness 
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Before an airport can 
develop a truly effective 
BCP, the most critical 
systems within the 
airport first need to be 
established. This can be 
done through a Business 
Impact Analysis (BIA). 
to more effectively address the research question. In the 
following, four key areas of interest are described which would 
greatly facilitate and improve our understanding of the 
relationship between BCM and high reliability with regards to 
airports.  
 
1) What are the most critical systems and functions within 
airports which need to be continued in times of a crisis?  
It is widely agreed upon in the field of crisis management, that it is 
important to understand and manage an organisation’s individual 
systems and interactions among sub-systems in order to 
effectively prevent and manage crises108. Before an airport can 
develop a truly effective business continuity plan, the most critical 
systems within the airport first need to be established. A 
systematic identification of the fundamental underlying system 
components and their functions may shed light on the main areas 
of concern as well as areas which could be improved to become 
less vulnerable109. Within communications infrastructure alone, 
eight critical system components have been identified. They 
include human, policy, hardware, software, networks, payload, 
environment and power systems110. As communications systems 
also represent critical infrastructure, it would be interesting to 
examine whether airports can be categorised according to similar 
critical systems. In terms of analysing the interdependencies and 
interactions between these critical systems, future research could 
make use of existing models described by Conrad et al. (2006), 
which were developed to quantify the interdependencies of 
critical infrastructure systems in the US.  
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The perhaps most common approach for identifying critical 
business functions is Business Impact Analysis (BIA)111. BIA is the 
foundation for developing business continuity plans112 and 
identifies those critical functions and processes which an 
organisation must perform to stay in business, it identifies risks to 
these critical functions and prioritises these risks according to 
their likelihood and consequences113. A visualisation of developing 
risk priorities is shown in Figure 4. According to the dimensions of 
likelihood and consequence this prioritisation process allows 
management to select and develop the most effective business 
continuity strategies for approaching an issue. A potential issue 
that is assessed as low likelihood and consequence would be 
deemed a reasonably insignificant issue. However, an issue 
deemed to have a higher likelihood and consequence is definitely 
a matter requiring close and active attention. 
 
 
 
Figure 4- Risk profile for a potential disruption (Conrad et al., 2006) 
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Airports should consider 
establishing means to 
measure the 
effectiveness and 
maturity of the BCP 
process within the 
organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Some of the objectives of BIA in commercial organisations include 
determining: 
 Impact of an outage 
 Criticality of business processes and work areas as related 
to total organisation functionality 
 Required recovery time and resources 
 Interdependence between business units (Mawson, 2003). 
 
Thus, in order to determine the most critical systems and 
processes within airports, a BIA must in addition to identifying the 
most critical sub-systems also determine existing risks to these 
critical functions. The results of a BIA may differ between airports 
due to different operating environments and demands but should 
nevertheless form the foundation for the development of business 
continuity strategy. However, strategy can only guide the 
implementation of practices, many of which need measurement; 
an issue dealt with in the following section.  
 
2) How can the effectiveness of BCM/ BCP practices be 
measured in airports?  
Once critical systems within an airport have been identified and 
characterised and a business continuity plan developed, it would 
be valuable to establish means to measure the effectiveness and 
maturity of the BCP process within an organisation. This could 
additionally build the foundation for examining the relationship 
between BCP practices and HR traits as Section 3 of this paper has 
suggested that effectively implemented and mature BCM/ BCP 
practices facilitate the generation of HR traits. This would imply 
that organisations with mature BCM processes are more likely to 
possess ‘reliability’ traits than organisations with less mature and 
effective BCM practices. In order to gauge the maturity of BCM 
practices in an organisation, Camastral (2009) developed a 
prototype maturity model.  
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An airport must consider 
how reliability measures 
can be standardised. 
Does overall reliability of 
an airport include flight 
delays and waiting time 
at customs and luggage 
collection? 
 
 
 
 
This BCM maturity model consists of four stages of maturity: 
novice, intermediate, advanced and mature (Camastral, 2009). 
The author describes nine crucial BCM processes, namely 
commitment, training, BCM and risk management relationship, 
communication, emergency response, continuity strategies, risk 
assessment, business impact analysis and awareness within these 
four stages of maturity which then provide an indicator of the 
maturity level within a given organisation. This kind of maturity 
model is only one example of an approach to evaluate the 
effectiveness of BCM and there remains much scope for future 
research.  
 
3) How can the level of reliability in airports be measured? 
Other than being able to measure the effectiveness of BCM/ BCP 
practices in airports, it would be of great value to develop a 
measurement tool for determining the level of reliability in various 
airports. The first step in establishing such a tool would be to 
create industry standardisation with regards to terminology and 
indicators of reliability, a process already underway in the US 
communications infrastructure114. Developing and establishing 
agreement on these reliability measures across the industry will 
perhaps be the most difficult task as there are many different 
processes and sub-systems to consider. For example, does the 
overall reliability of an airport include flight delays and waiting 
times at customs and luggage collection? It would also need to be 
considered whether reliability in international airports should be 
measured differently to reliability in domestic / regional airports 
due to their different environments and varying demands on the 
system. As such, it would not be reasonable to compare regional 
airports to international airports in terms of their reliability. Once 
reliability measurements have been defined, partaking airports 
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would then report their measurements so that industry averages, 
comparisons and benchmarks can be developed. The 
development of reliable and valid tools to measure both the 
effectiveness of BCM/ BCP and gauge resulting levels of reliability 
in airports would then enable an analysis to be conducted on 
whether effective BCM/ BCP has a direct positive relationship to 
reliability levels.  
 
 
4) What can be learned from airport failures in the past? What 
processes / traits were these airports lacking which may have 
prevented the crisis?   
The notion that organisations can ‘learn’ has been around for 
decades. More recently, there has been an increasing focus on 
organisational learning from failures and crises in an effort to 
prevent the reoccurrence of such incidents115. Organisational 
learning involves changing and adapting organisational goals, 
decision-making and forecasts in order to make them more 
realistic in the face of changing circumstances116. It has been 
argued that organisational learning is essential for success in 
shifting environments117. Unfortunately empirical studies and 
evidence regarding organisational learning from failures, 
particularly in airports, is still rare even though the requirement 
for rapid change in the face of error is obvious.  
 
Past failures and crises at airports could be studied similarly to the 
research conducted by Stead and Smallman (1999) who analysed 
the failures of three major banks. This study did not only show 
that the banks appeared incapable of learning from past failures 
but also that there existed numerous similarities in these business 
                                                 
115
 Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Stead & Smallman, 1999 
116
 Baumard & Starbuck, 2005 
117
 Senge, 1990, cited in Baumard & Starbuck, 2005 
Airports of the Future 
© 2010 QUT 
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
failures118. It would be very useful to discover, in future research, 
whether on the historical record airport failures possess 
similarities or whether these airports were lacking specific 
processes which could have prevented the crisis, for example BCP 
practices. Such research would then enable airports to learn from 
the deficiencies found in airport failures and avoid similar 
vulnerabilities and incidents in the future.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to more closely explore and examine the 
role of business continuity management in creating high reliability 
traits in airports. In an effort to address the research question 
“Can BCM practices create HR traits in airports?” the paper has 
discussed key concepts, theories and frameworks before analysing 
potential links between business continuity and high reliability 
theory and the potential application of high reliability theory to 
critical infrastructure such as airports. Section 3 established that 
there are a series of logical relationships between BCM and high 
reliability traits, implying that BCM practices can in fact facilitate 
the generation of HR traits. These theoretical relationships were 
further supported by depicting the existing overlap between BCM 
practices and mindfulness traits which have been found to 
facilitate reliability119.  
 
Section 4 then reviewed some of the current literature which 
applies HRT to critical infrastructure systems and it became 
evident that there is a distinct lack of research specifically on 
airports and reliability. However, the review highlighted a variety 
of potentially significant considerations for studying the 
application of HRT in airports in the future. Based on the four 
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needed to better 
understand the role of 
BCM practices in 
creating HR traits. The 
apparent importance of 
reliability in airports 
cannot be understated. 
sections which comprise this paper, the author developed a basic 
framework as a means to conceptualise and visualise the roles of 
threat, vulnerability, reliability as well as important airport 
processes, such as BCP (Figure 3). The framework suggests that 
the airport system is continuously and inherently vulnerable to 
threats and that the creation of high reliability traits can 
potentially act as a barrier against these vulnerabilities given there 
are certain processes and practices effectively in place within the 
airport.  Due to the fact that the amount of current research 
investigating the role of BCM for creating high reliability traits is 
minimal and research studies investigating reliability in airports is 
scarce, the research question in the current paper could not be 
answered satisfactorily.  
 
For this reason, four potential areas of interest for future research 
were presented in the discussion, which would greatly improve 
our understanding of the role of BCM practices in creating HR 
traits in airport systems: 
 Examine what the most critical systems and functions within 
airports are in order to develop an effective business 
continuity plan.  
 Develop standardised means to measure or audit the 
effectiveness of BCM/ BCP in airports. 
 Develop standardised measurements of the level of reliability 
in airports. 
 Determine how airports could engage in organisational 
learning from past airport failures.  
 
Based on the current under-assessment of the role of BCM 
practices in creating HR traits, this paper has justified the need for 
increased future research into these four areas in order to 
effectively address the research question ‘Can BCM practices 
create high reliability traits in airports?’  
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Appendix: Guidance from the relevant literature 
 
Airports as Socio-Technical Systems 
Key Points Questions 
- Socio-technical systems (STS) describe 
a system which is made up of two 
jointly independent but correlative 
interactive systems – the social and 
the technical system. 
- This approach seeks to place equal 
weight on both the social and the 
technical aspect of a system in an 
effort to gain a comprehensive picture 
of the system as a whole.  
- It further emphasises that the 
potential for threats and disturbances 
is not only inherent in the technical 
system but also in the human 
management of these technical 
systems. 
 Is there a suitable alignment of 
technical controls and administration 
and managerial controls present in the 
airport? 
 Are the administrative and managerial 
controls appropriate and sufficient for 
the technological aspect of the 
system? 
 
Vulnerability 
Key Points Questions 
- Organisational crises occur when 
vulnerable systems are triggered into 
some spiral of unfavourable dynamics.  
- It is thus critical to be aware of and 
understand the organisation’s 
vulnerabilities. 
- Vulnerability reducing factors include: 
BCM, safety culture, safety training, 
mindfulness and a commitment to 
resilience. 
 What are the key vulnerabilities of the 
airport? 
 Are vulnerability reducing factors in 
place? 
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BCM 
Key Points Questions 
- Before an airport can develop a truly 
effective business continuity plan, the 
most critical systems within the airport 
first need to be established. 
- The implementation of BCM practices 
helps organisations to identify and 
manage the vulnerabilities and 
incidents which could potentially 
disrupt or damage critical business 
processes, alleviate the impact of 
these risks and ensures that business 
processes are recovered without too 
much delay.  
- Adequate financial and human 
resources as well as managerial 
acceptance are imperative elements to 
effectively implement BCM. 
 What are the most critical systems 
within the airport which need to be 
incorporated into the BCP? 
 Does airport management accept and 
support the need for BCM? 
 Does the airport have sufficient 
financial and human resources to 
effectively implement BCM practices? 
 Are there any measures in place to 
measure and evaluate the 
effectiveness and maturity of the 
BCM/ BCP process? 
 
 
 
Reliability 
Key Points Questions 
- High Reliability Theory, which 
developed from closely examining 
HROs, argues that certain 
organisational characteristics and 
processes can reduce an organisation’s 
exposure to risk while maintaining 
reliability and the capability to meet 
production goals. 
- Some of the HRO properties include: 
 Decision making is decentralised 
and executed quickly 
 Safety culture 
 Structural flexibility & redundancy 
 Sustained high technical 
performance 
 Does the airport have any of the 
described reliability traits such as high 
degrees of responsibility and 
accountability? 
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 High degrees of responsibility and 
accountability 
 External regulatory groups 
- However, it is difficult to develop 
standardisation with regards to 
terminology and indicators of 
reliability which would allow reliability 
to be measured. 
 
Organisational Learning 
Key Points Questions 
- Organisational learning involves 
changing and adapting organisational 
goals, decision-making and forecasts in 
order to make them more realistic in 
the face of changing circumstances. 
- Organisational learning could prove 
critical in preventing future crises from 
occurring. 
 How does the airport record and store 
information on past disruptions or 
crises? 
 Is there any evidence of organisational 
learning within the airport? For 
example, does decision making change 
within the airport after crisis events? 
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